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Karen Armstrong in The Battle for God expresses her fear of the rise of 
fundamentalism. She alerts and takes a deep look at its horrific 
manifestations. She stresses that “ One of the most startling developments 
of the late twentieth century has been the emergence within every major 
religious tradition of militant piety popularly known as 
“fundamentalism"….Fundamentalists have gunned down worshippers in 
mosque, have killed doctors and nurses…have shots their president, and 
have even toppled a powerful government….Fundamentalists have no time 
for democracy, pluralism, religious toleration, peacekeeping, free 
speech….”1 Indonesia can be an “exact laboratory” to prove Armstrong’s 
concerns about fundamentalism, where there have been series of terrorist 
attacks and suicide bombings since 2000 that behooves the Indonesian 
stakeholders to giving their very eyes on the roots of the problem. There 
have been 552 acts of terror in 21 years since 2000.2 However, is 
fundamentalism solely rooted in the religious militant piety? The studies of 
the roots of fundamentalism are generally divided into two lines of 
thoughts. The first is those who admit the religious militant piety as the 
only root of fundamentalism. The other is those who take into account the 
problem of social injustice in the field of politics and economy as the 
foundation of the movement of the fundamentalists. This article is going to 
examine the second opinion of the absence of social justice and 
multidimensional approach of development at all level as the backbones 
and the determining factors of the emergence of the Indonesian 
fundamentalism. 
 
1 Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000): p. 5. 
2 See the report of Kompas.com (30/03/2021, 15:46 WIB), 552 Aksi Teror Terjadi Sejak Tahun 
2000, Terbanyak di Era SBY-Susilo Bambang Yudhoyon: 552 Acts of Terror since 2000 and most 
Occurred in the Era of SBY. It is shown in the repot of the Department of Politics and Security of 
LAB 45 (Laboratorium Indonesia 2045). LAB 45 is a research institute that concern on the 
multidimensional issues and on the global development in the field of politics and economy. The 
institute places its eyes on the process of transformation, and provides research and analyses for 
the Indonesian stakeholders in pursuing the goal of Indonesia as an advanced state in 2045. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rise of the concern on the Indonesian fundamentalism has been 
undertaken since the rise of terrorist attacks that has been started up four 
decades ago. The hijacking of Garuda Airline in 1981 by the religious extremist 
group of Komando Jihad (Jihad Command)3 and the bombing of Borobudur 
temple in 1985 waken and echo the awareness of the Indonesian people, 
particularly the stakeholders of the danger of fundamentalism. After the fall of 
authoritarian regime of Suharto in 1998 Indonesia not only “inbreathing the 
fresh air of democracy” but also at the same time getting into social turbulence 
because of the noxiousness the religious revivalism, cultism and fundamentalism 
bear into the societal life that has been uneasy to be ceased till the present days. 
Armstrong’s point could be very precise to describe the face of Indonesian 
society in which “the fundamentalists have no time for democracy, pluralism, 
religious toleration, peacekeeping, free speech….”4 I take an example from the 
repot of Aliansi Nasional Bhinneka Tunggal (National Alliance of Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika) in 2015, referring to the research data of University of Canberra. It 
shows that there have been 1000 churches burned and banned by the 
fundamentalist and the extremist groups.5  
The required question needed to be placed on the table of discourse of 
fundamentalism is: Is Indonesian fundamentalism merely a militant piety of 
those who concern only in the preservation of religious authority, doctrines and 
its dogmas? Through this article I invite the readers to look closer at the 
complexity of the Indonesian fundamentalism, particularly from the political 
economic dimension. The article is going to focus on the relation between the 
 
3 Komando Jihad (Jihad Command: JC) is an Islamic fundamentalist extremist group. It was 
founded in 1968 and exterminated through the intelligent raid operation in mid of 1980s. The 
emersion of JC remains a controversy among researchers and analysts that are split into two 
groups. The first group is those who admit the viewpoint of the New Order regime that the 
establishment of JC and the sequences of its acts of terror aim to form the Islamic state of 
Indonesia and the Indonesian Islamic Revolutionary Council, and also to express their political 
stand against national Constitution of 1945 and the national principle of Pancasila. The second 
group is those who admit the theory of conspiracy that the establishment of JC was purely a 
political delude of the New Order regime to distract public attention from the election fraud of 
1977. However, the dissent of the two groups does not dismiss the fact that JC in essence has an 
objective of the establishment of Islamic state. 
4 Karen Armstrong (2000), The Battle for God: p. 5. 
5 See Report of CNN Indonesia (Wednesday, 14/10/2015). Pembakaran Gereja Capai 1000 
Kasus Pasca Reformasi: Churches Burned Reaching 1000 Cases after Reformation.  
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problem of political economy and the revival of fundamentalism as a social 
movement against social injustice. In brief words we may say that Indonesian 
fundamentalism basically is a movement of class struggle against social injustice. 
But, before examining further on the problem of fundamentalism, it would be 
important to briefly highlight of what fundamentalism and how it began in 
human civilization. 
The word 'fundamentalism' was first popularized by Curtis Lee Laws,6 an 
editor at the journal Watchman-Examiner, in 1920 in a compilation for the 
journal entitled The Watchman-Examiner - a National Baptist Paper.7 This word 
is used limited to the scope of theological thought and religious movements. 
George C. Marsden8 defines fundamentalism in the following phrase that “a 
fundamentalist is an evangelical who is angry about something….Evangelical is 
broadly defined to include those in traditions that emphasize the Bible as the 
highest religious authority….”9 Fundamentalism was originally used to explain 
the renunciation of the American conservative Protestants against the liberalists 
and their liberal theology.10  
Liberal Protestantism is an intellectual movement within the Christian 
church that attempt to adapt Christian doctrines to the rise of the evolutionary 
science and to the development of biblical criticism. The liberalists endeavor to 
reshape Christian theology in the presence of modern science. Charles Darwin's 
theory of natural selection, for example, re-question and concurrently reshape 
the beliefs of Christians in the theory of creation of the universe. Darwinian 
theorem rocks the Christian creationism and their belief of the divine miracle 
that this universe was created in six days as written in the Book of Genesis. 
Meanwhile, liberal theology is a modern Christian theology in which scripture is 
no longer taken literally as in traditionalist church. Bible in liberal theology is 
interpreted in the light of reasoning and adapted to modern intellectual and 
socio-cultural context. It is also an intellectual revolutionary in theosophy, 
 
6 C.L. Laws was an editor of a journal founded by the American Baptist group, a journal for all 
Baptists. Laws has been editors of this journal since 1913 and ended in 1939. 
7 The Watchman Examiner is a bulletin of Baptist Church organization which regularly 
publishes articles relating to the mission of the Baptist church. This bulletin was first published in 
1913.  
8 George C. Marsden is an American historian, specifically history of American culture and 
Christianity. Marsden most dominantly concerns on the history of the interaction between 
American culture and Christianity-evangelicalism.  
9 George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (United Kingdom: Oxford 
University Press, 2006): p. 235-236. 
10 Thomas Schirrmacher, Fundamentalism: When Religion becomes Dangerous (Bonn: Verlag 
fur Kultur and Wissenschaft-Culture and Science Publication, 2013): p. 9. 
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particularly theology and philosophy of the era of enlightenment and 
rationalism.  
The huge alteration on Christian theology the rationalism swayed was 
the transformation of interpreting dogmas or sacred texts that took into account 
modern science and ethics. The scripture is no longer interpreted and taken into 
account solely on triple conviction of traditionalist Christians: sola scriptura-
inerrancy of bible (Scripturalism), sola fide-the salvation of man comes only 
from justification by faith (solafidianism), and sola gratia-salvation comes only 
from the divine grace.11 According to James Barr there are three major features 
of the fundamentalists’ doctrines: 1) a very strong emphasis on the inerrancy of 
the Bible, the absence from it of any sorts of error; 2) a strong hostility to 
modern theology and to the methods, results and implications of modern critical 
study of the Bible; 3) an assurance that those who do not share their religious 
viewpoint are not really ‘true Christians’ at all.12 
Religious doctrines and dogmas in face of modern science are driven to 
be interpreted under the light of reason and also taking into consideration the 
relevance to its social context. Fundamentalism then can be understood as the 
repudiation over the rationalistic exegesis of sacred texts that inclines to 
discredit supernatural facet of Christian beliefs. Fundamentalism that at the very 
beginning aimed to sustain, if we may use the term of Karen Armstrong, the 
“Bible based-society and state - Biblicism”13 eventually extends to political 
movement as arose in the Moral Majority Organization of Jerry Falwell.14 The 
shift is assuredly like a necessary prerequisite, specifically in third world states 
or developing countries, in confronting any sorts of ill-systems of politics and 
economy.  
Fundamentalism in the contemporary discourse is no longer associated 
only with the militant piety of the extremist groups, but also to political 
ideological movements.15 The tragedy of 09/11 has been taken as the vile feature 
of fundamentalism, particularly in the barbarous act the extremist religious 
group of Al-Qaeda which legitimizes violence. The feature of fundamentalism 
 
11 See Josiah Trenham, Rock and Sand: An Orthodox Appraisal of the Protestant Reformers 
and Their Teachings, ed. Michael Monos (US: Newrome Press LLC, 2018): p. 187-192. See also 
Ewald M. Plass, What Luther says: An Anthology (St. Louis: Concordia, 1959): p. 63. See also John 
R. de Witt, What is the Reformed Faith? (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1981): p. 5. 
12 James Barr, Fundamentalism (London: SCM Press, 1981): p. 1.  
13 See Karen Armstrong (2000), The Battle for God: p. 294. 
14 Jerry Falwell (1933-2007) was an American Baptist pastor, a strong believer, and 
conservative activist. He was also a politician of the Republican Political Party. See also Thomas 
Schirrmacher (2013), Fundamentalism: p. 11. 
15 Thomas Schirrmacher (2013), Fundamentalism: p. 11-12. 
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then is not only to claim of the absolute truth of the religious militants, but also 
associated with the detrimental acts of intolerance, anti-plurality, anti-
democracy, anti-human rights, and terrorism. Karen Armstrong aptly explicates 
it in her challenging statement that “Fundamentalists have gunned down 
worshippers in a mosque, have killed the doctors and nurses who work in 
abortion clinics, have shot their presidents, and have toppled down a powerful 
government….Fundamentalists have no time for democracy, pluralism, religious 




The caution on the emergence of Indonesian contemporary 
fundamentalism in general is not only propelled by the religious devotion of the 
perpetuation of religious dogmas and doctrines of the religious supremacists 
against modern ideologies, but also driven by the necessity of transforming social 
system. The insistence of the implementation of “Qur’an-based society - 
Qur’anism” or “Sharia-based state - Sharianism” of the hardline religious groups 
such as HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir),17 JI (Jemaah 
Islamiyah: Islamic Congregations),18 FPI (Front Pembela Islam: Front of Islamic 
Defenders),19 and JT (Jamaah Tabligh),20 for example, is not only aimed at itself, 
 
16 See Karen Armstrong (2000), The Battle for God: p. 5-6. See also Thomas Schirrmacher 
(2013), Fundamentalism: When Religion becomes Dangerous: p. 14. 
17 HTI is an Islamic political organization. Ideologically it promotes the establishment of 
Islamic state under the law of Islamic Sharia or Islamic law. HTI is neither a religious or social 
organization, nor a scientific-academic movement. It is an Islamic organization that strives to 
uphold the Khilafah Islamiyah (Islamic caliphate or Islamic state). Though HTI partisans do not 
consider their movement political, but in fact their activities are political. In Indonesian politics 
HTI is affiliated with PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), an Islamic political party that promotes the 
establishment of Islamic state. In Ahmad Syafii Maarif’s observation, the political mission of PKS is 
very much inspired by the movement of Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) 
headquartered in Egypt that thriving the implementation of sharia.    
18 JI has close links with al-Qaeda and Islamic insurgents in the Philippines. JI is claimed to be 
headed by Indonesia’s most radical cleric, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Ba’asyir has been known as a 
controversial Islamic cleric for some reasons such as his fundamentalist ideology manifested in his 
conviction of anti-Pancasila and the establishment of Islamic state. See Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. 
Kaptein (editors), Islam, Politics and Change: The Indonesian Experience after the Fall of Suharto 
(Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2016): p. 13. 
19 FPI is an Islamic fundamentalist conservative organization, established in 1998 after the 
downfall of the authoritarian regime of Suharto. Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, the founder of FPI, 
was supported by the political and military elites in establishing FPI. The pivotal aim of its 
establishment contained in three objectives as well as its demands: 1. Adversity of Islamic 
congregation under the reign of civil and military elites, particularly the violation of human rights 
against the Islamic people. 2. Moral decadency that is increasingly rampant in all sectors. 3. An 
obligation to preserve and maintain the Islamic values in the social life. 
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but rather implicitly contains as counterattack against any unjust systems of 
politics, economy, social and culture by providing an alternative of the Islamic 
system. Ahmad Syafii Maarif (forth: ASM) describes the phenomenon of the 
fundamentalist movement of those religious groups in sarcastic terms, that they 
are nothing more than just “preman berjubah: robed hoodlum” and the theology 
they impose to other groups and people in the societal life is “teologi maut: the 
death theology”.21  However, their movements are very much provoked by the 
political aims. On this matter, ASM stresses that the center of the identity 
politics in Indonesia dominantly is ethnicity, closed ideologies and religion for 
the interest of the local elites.22 
In practical ground, the advent of the Indonesian fundamentalism is 
marked by the movements of militant religious organizations like HTI, JI, FPI 
and JT, and political parties like PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Party of 
Prosperous Justice) ASM categorizes as a militant religious party that politically 
urge the implementation of Islamic law into the state constitution.23 ASM 
examines that though in its official organizational documents, PKS admits 
democracy, pluralism, and nationalism of Indonesia, and even its political 
constitution is officially guided by the Madinah Charter that profess the 
plurality of religion of Indonesia, PKS practically is no doubt endorses an Islamic 
exclusive political agenda. PKS in paper is inclusive, but its inclusiveness, for 
ASM, is merely a temporary political tactics and a strategy of adapting its 
political strategy with the sociological facts of the Indonesian society.24  
Then it must be admitted that investigating the origin of the Indonesian 
fundamentalism is the same as tracing back to the history of the advent of 
religious groups and organizations. The convincing hint of the emergence of 
Indonesian fundamentalism can be found in the rebellion of DI/TII/NII (Darul 
Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia/Negara Islam Indonesia:  Islamic State/Indonesian 
Islamic Army/Indonesian Islamic State) led by Sekarmadji Maridjan 
 
20 Jamaah Tabligh is an Islamic organization for preaching. The main objective of this group is 
to restore the Islamic teachings, doctrines and traditions to the practices of the time of the prophet 
Muhammad, including the reviving of the practices of rites and Islamic custom.    
21 See the report of Kompas.com (08/04/2017), Syafii Maarif: Negara Tidak Boleh Kalah oleh 
Penganut “Teologi Maut” = State Should not be Overpowered by Adherents of “Theology of 
Death”. See also Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita = Identity 
Politics and the Future of Our Pluralism (Jakarta: PUSAD Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, 2010). 
22 Ahmad Syafii Maarif (2010), Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita: p. 3. 
23 See the analysis of Ahmad Syafii Maarif et al, Syariat Islam Yes, Syariat Islam No: Dilema 
Piagam Madinah dalam Amandemen UUD 1945: Islamic Sharia Yes, Islamic Sharia No: The 
Dilemma of Medina Charter in the Amendment of 1945 Constitution, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001). 
24 Ahmad Syafii Maarif (2010), Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita: p. 26. 
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Kartosoewirjo.25 DI was established in August 7th 1949. The rebellion was 
basically both a confrontation and political standing of the Islamic group against 
the Dutch imperialism who attempted to reoccupy Indonesia through a very 
political treaty, called Renville Treaty (Perjanjian Renville).26 It was West Java 
from which DI emerged that was re-annexed by the Dutch. Kartosoewirjo’s 
political conviction to establishing Negara Islam Indonesia - NII (Indonesian 
Islamic State: IIS) under the principle of Islamic Sharia (Islamic Law), in spite of 
driven by political aims against the annexation of Dutch, also strongly complies 
the requirements of fundamentalism. Here is the original proclamation of 
DI/TII:  
“The Proclamation of the Establishment of NII/IIS: We, the Muslims of 
the Indonesian nation, declare: the establishment of NII/IIS, then the law 
that applies to NII/IIS is Islamic law. Allah the Great! Allah the Great! 
Allah the Great!  
Signed: S.M.Kartosoewirjo.  Madinah-Indonesia, 12 Sjawal 1368/August 
7th 1948.”27 
The establishment of IIS basically has two main reasons; terminating the 
re-occupancy of Dutch over Indonesian territory particularly West Java and 
disenchantment of Kartosoewirjo over Sukarno who acceded to the Renville 
Treaty. IIS politically has a beneficial objective for Indonesia that of terminating 
 
25 Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo (1905-1962) is one of the Islamic prominent figures in 
Indonesian history who led the rebellion of Darur Islam against the Indonesian government from 
1949 to 1962. The aim of his rebellion is to compel the implementation of sacred teaching of Al-
Qur’an and the establishment of Islamic state of Indonesia based on Sharia law. At his young age, 
Kartosoewirjo was succeed to study at ELS, a school established by the Dutch for European, after 
graduating from Inlandsche School der Tweede Klasse (ISTK), a school established by the Dutch 
for native Indonesians. At the time of his education at ELS he met Notodiharjo, a modern Islamic 
figure and from him Kartosoewirjo learned the ideas of modern Islam. His political activity and 
ideas was starting to evolve when he took another step of his education at Nederlands Indische 
Artsen School and after joining Syarikat Islam (Islamic Association), an Islamic merchant 
association, under the guidance of its top leader, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto. His political ideas and 
movement was very much influenced Tjokroaminoto.  
26 Renville Treaty is a political treaty between the Dutch and the Indonesian government held 
in December 8th of 1947 on the US warship of Renville that was anchored in Jakarta. The treaty 
was mediated by special committee of the three states of Australia, Belgium and United States. 
Three points of agreement of the treaty gave rise to rebellion of DI/TII: 1. The Netherlands only 
recognizes Central Java, Yogyakarta and Sumatra as part of the Indonesian territory. 2. The 
agreement was made on a demarcation line separating Indonesian territory from the occupied 
territory of the Dutch. 3. The Indonesian national army (TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia) had to 
withdraw from West Java and East Java. 
27 See Karl D. Jackson, Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion (California: University of 
California Press, 1980). See also Djashar Djamil, Tri Suseno, and Wahyu Juantono, Pemberontakan 
DI/TII: Di Jawa Barat dan Jawa Tengah serta Operasi Penumpasannya: The Rebellion of Islamic 
State/Indonesian Islamic Army: In West Java and the Operation of Its Extermination (Jakarta: 
Penerbit Dinas Sejarah Angkatan Darat, 2018). 
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colonialism of the Dutch. For the short term end, employing religious ideology 
as a bind of patriotic spirit against the imperialists was practically advantageous 
for Indonesia. It is only applicable and beneficial in time of struggling for 
independence. But, it was disadvantageous for the long term end because 
employing the religious ideology for political purpose in time of independence 
in the multicultural state of Indonesia leads to various social detriments. 
However the repudiation of the Renville Treaty is compulsion for Indonesia 
only because the treaty takes side for the Dutch and noxiousness for the 
Indonesian.    
In general, Indonesian fundamentalism has its typical characteristic. 
Indonesian fundamentalism has its roots in the movement of preserving religious 
doctrines and it evolves hand in hand with political preference notably with the 
Islamic politics. Indonesian fundamentalism is political in nature. Its emergence 
is slightly driven by the need of Islam against the ideology religiously 
unprofessed. It is mostly driven by political preferences of the political Islamists. 
It evolves side by side with the political contention between the two groups; the 
defenders of the unitary system of state and religion, and the defenders of the 
separation of the two like in the movement of Darul Islam. To comprehend the 
Indonesian fundamentalism must be at once taking in the political movements of 
the religious political parties and religious organizations, from the time of pre-
independence till the present. Indonesian fundamentalism, if we may refer to 
the classification of Azyumardi Azra, is kind of a hybridization of “pre-modern 
fundamentalism or traditional fundamentalism” and “contemporary 
fundamentalism or neo-fundamentalism”.28 Traditional fundamentalism breaks 
out from a certain circumstances within Muslims themselves, and the rise of the 
contemporary fundamentalism is more of a reaction to the penetration of social 
systems that are considered unfair for the fundamentalists.  
In my point of view, the formative factors of the Indonesian 
fundamentalism are divided into two ways of thoughts. The first is those who 
consider the “claim of the absolutism of religious truth” as a single determining 
factor of the rise of the Indonesian fundamentalism. Religious creed on the 
inerrancy of sacred texts requires them to take into account religious dogmas as a 
sole reference for any applicable laws and norms. It is a traditional 
 
28 Azyumardi Azra, Pergolakan Politik Islam: dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme, hingga 
Post-Modernisme: Islamic Political Upheaval: from Fundamentalism, Modernism, to Post-
Modernism (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996): p. 111. See also: Achmad Jainuri, Orientasi Ideologi 
Gerakan Islam: Konservatisme, Fundamentalisme, Sekularisme dan Modernisme = Ideological 
Orientation of Islamic Movement: Conservatism, Fundamentalism, Secularism and Modernism 
(Surabaya: Penerbit LPAM-Lembaga Pengkajian Agama dan Masyarakat = Publisher of the 
Institution of Religious and Community Studies, 2004): p. 73-74. 
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fundamentalism that is purely a religious fundamentalism. It is a traditional 
fundamentalism. Azra defines traditional fundamentalism as the movement of 
reviving the genuineness of religious dogmas, sacred texts and traditions. It is 
more genuine in the sense that it is purposefully inward-oriented to its 
adherents. It is a pure religious movement of upholding of faith and tradition 
which is exclusively limited to its adherents. Magisterial fundamentalism29 can 
also be referred to this type of fundamentalism that can be defined as an act of 
maintaining the authority of dogmas, doctrines, and religious traditions. I call 
this type of fundamentalism as religio-theologico fundamentalism (RTF). It is a 
movement of maintaining religious doctrines and their authority through 
theological rationalization at least for its adherents. The second is those who 
perceive the emergence of the Indonesian fundamentalism as the act of repelling 
any unjust systems of social, politics, economy and culture. This type of 
fundamentalism can be categorized as contemporary fundamentalism. Its 
emergence in essence is a desideratum of repelling contemporary social systems 
that are considered not in line with beliefs of the fundamentalists. Some scholars 
categorize it as militant fundamentalism.30 Both types are applicable to the 
Indonesian fundamentalism. 
I rather call the combination of the two types as religio-politico 
fundamentalism (RPF). RPF is a fundamentalism that is not purely a religious 
movement. It is also an outward-oriented movement and that is political 
interest. In RPF, the movement of purifying the religious teachings and 
traditions are used as political strategy to influence the political choices of its 
adherents. We may say that in RPF religion is used as an instrument for political 
interest and vice versa. I take an example among the others of the existence of 
RPF ASM delivers in his analysis. 
The metamorphosis of the movement of the Indonesian Islamic 
organizations, particularly the fundamentalist groups, can be taken as the vivid 
instances of RPF, particularly their place in the phenomenon of identity politics. 
It is undoubtedly to stress that the discourse of fundamentalism in Indonesia 
goes hand in hand with the discourse of the phenomenon of identity politics. 
The phenomenon of identity politics in Indonesia can be placed as one of the 
main indications of the phenomenon of RPF. Identity politics originally is 
defined for the first time by L.A. Kauffman. He traces its early phase from the 
 
29 See: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330514457. The paper presented at the 
National Seminar on Religious Fundamentalism and Social Order at Andhra University, 
Visakhapatnam, February 26-27, 2010 by Domenic Marbaniang, Religious Fundamentalism and 
Social Order: A Philosophical Perspective: p. 9. 
30 Domenic Marbaniang (2010), Religious Fundamentalism and Social Order: A Philosophical 
Perspective: p. 9-10. 
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student movement of anti-violence, known as SNCC; The Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee in America. SNCC mainly concerned on the advocacy 
of civil rights in America in the early 1960s.31 The movement was expanded to 
the identity politics in 1970s in the midst of social issues such as minority class, 
gender, feminism, race, skin color, ethnicity and many others. The bottom aim 
of identity politics in American history is the struggle of the alienated minority 
groups and ethnics against the domination of majority class in the field of 
politics, economy, social, culture, education, and many other aspects of social 
life. Identity politics in early time of its emersion was closely to Marxian class 
struggle against any sorts of unjust systems of politics and economy.  
Identity politics in Indonesia, particularly the politics of the Islamic 
fundamentalist groups along the Reformation era, can be considered as negative 
identity politics. It is reasonable of saying it that their movements in the 
Indonesian politics are much more exclusive under the spirit of religious 
political objectives. Identity politics is considered one of the main features of 
fundamentalism performed by the fundamentalist groups. Their political 
movement can be counted as identity politics not only in terms of “class 
struggle”, but also closely to an exclusive religious movement. They employ and 
exploit religion as political instrument for the sake of their political preference. 
Their identity politics is very close to militant fundamentalism that is 
eliminative in the form of alienating and eliminating other groups that are not in 
line with their religious ideology. The acknowledged analysis of ASM 
convincingly elucidates about the single line of relation between identity politics 
and fundamentalism. He tightly concerns on the feature of the Indonesian 
fundamentalist groups. ASM in general associates fundamentalism with the 
establishment and the movements of religious groups from the Reform 
Movement in 1998 to the present. He insists that the emergence of the 
fundamentalist groups come up hand in hand with the dynamic of identity 
politics, and the roles of the Islamic fundamentalist groups are notable in 
shaping the problems of fundamentalism in Indonesia. In his scientific oration 
entitled "Identity Politics and the Future of Our Pluralism"32 at the Nurchloish 
Madjid Memorial Lecture (NMML), ASM presented the problem of 
fundamentalism.  
 
31 Ahmad Syafii Maarif (2010), Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita: p. 4. See also 
L.A. Kauffman, The Anti-Politics of Identity, Socialist Review, No. 1, Vol. 20 (Jan.-March 1990): p. 
67-80. 
32 Ahmad Syafii Maarif (2010), Politik Identitas dan Masa Depan Pluralisme Kita: p. vii. 
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Contemporary scholars, I consider Dustin Berna’s explication as one of 
the more relevant points, correlate fundamentalism with the political economic 
turmoil. There are four conditions within fundamentalism he takes into account:  
“1. Marxism; he socioeconomic inequality argument of Marx is the sole 
reason for collective action of Islamic fundamentalists. 2. Resource 
mobilization theory; resources (the resources are money and population) 
are positively associated with the number and strength of Islamic 
fundamentalist movements. 3. Political process theory; the key 
foundation of political process theory includes the import role that 
political institutions play in facilitating social movement….This is 
especially true in the Islamic world because westernization, 
modernization, Americanization, poverty, socioeconomic inequality, and 
lack of democracy all help facilitate Islamic collective behavior, 
specifically the rise and success of Islamic fundamentalists. 4. New social 
movement theory; the social movement participants are looking to 
enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society and that membership 
in these movement(s) falls into two categories: those who paying the 
costs of modernization and those who have been marginalized by the 
development of the welfare state and the new middle class”.33 
The four conditions Dustin takes to picture the relation between 
fundamentalism and political economic turmoil are relevant to the Indonesian 
RPF. The rise of the Indonesian fundamentalist groups contains a Marxian 
movement in the sense that their movement is a social movement. The 
fundamentalists through political movement stand to fight against the 
socioeconomic inequality. It is fitted to place this view on Indonesian context. In 
2020 the number of poor people is about 26.42 million.34 The economic 
imbalance between the haves and the have not is sharply getting wider. "The 
income of one conglomerate in Indonesia is almost the same as the income of 37 
million farm workers."35 This wide gap between the rich and the poor is the 
Indonesia’s biggest problem today. In front of the problem, the resource 
mobilization theory is very much relevant that the Islamic fundamentalist 
 
33 See Dissertation of Dustin Berna that has been accepted for inclusion in University of New 
Orleans Theses and Dissertation by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. See: D. 
Dustin Berna, A Revolutionary Perspective on Social Movement: Fundamentalism in the Islamic 
World (Louisiana: Univeristy of New Orleans, 2008): p. 4-7. 
34 See https://www.bps.go.id/pressrelease/2020/07/15/1744/persentase-penduduk-miskin-
maret-2020-naik-menjadi-9-78-persen.html. Press release of Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia 
(Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia) on 15.07.2020 with the title: “Presentase Penduduk 
Miskin Maret 2020 naik menjadi 9.78 persen” (The percentage of poor people in March 2020 
increased to 9.78 percent).  
35 The researcher and analyst at Megawati Institute, Faishal Rahman, discovers that the 
income of 40 richest people in Indonesia approximately grow 17 percent between 2006 and 2016. 
See: Tempo.co, ed. Dewi Rina Cahyani, Wednesday, 21.03.2018 at 17:25. 
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groups, as they confidently stand to tackle down the inequality and striving for 
justice.36 Islamic fundamentalism is basically a social movement against the 
discriminatory system in the contemporary era, including against the 
imperialism in the colonial time. The bottom line of the movement of the 
Islamic fundamentalists can be viewed as an “alternative system” proposed by 
the fundamentalists groups against the contemporary system that fail to bring 
prosperity by employing religious fervor as an alternative choice to amplify their 
militancy in striving for fairness.  
 
PURSUANCE OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT 
Indonesian fundamentalism is a complex social fact that must be closely 
scrutinize beyond the religious movement of preserving religious supremacy and 
absolutism; militancy of claiming and standing up for the absolute truth of 
sacred texts, religious doctrines and religious traditions. To comprehend it 
requires a multidimensional approach beyond its untoward implications into 
social lives such as intolerance, extremism, and terrorism. It needs to be 
examined from various perspectives, and its linkage to the economic and 
political quandaries is fundamental to be comprehensively comprehended. This 
is the time to deeply examine the emergence of the Indonesian fundamentalism 
as a reaction to any unjust system of economy and politics, both in global and 
national level.  
I use the analysis of contemporary researchers to examine the 
Indonesian fundamentalism, like Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, Yahya Wijaya, and 
other scholars. Rissakota, for example, perceives that Indonesian 
fundamentalism is a sort of socio-political and socio-economic movement of the 
religious groups in tackling down any kinds of the unfairness of socio-economic 
and political system.37 Rissakota both quotes and rejects the idea of Paul F. 
Knitter who perceives that “The free market has become the new, universal, 
 
36 Place this situation in the Armstrong’s analysis. She convinces that the one of the main 
goals of the Islamic fundamentalism and the movement of Islamic politics is to pursue social 
justice. See Karen Armstrong, Sejarah Islam; Telaah Ringkas -Komprehensif Perkembangan Islam 
Sepanjang Zaman terj.Yuliani Liputo, Bandung: Mizan, 2014): p. 224. See also the analysis of R. 
Hrair Dekmejian in Sireen T. Hunter (editor), The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and 
Unity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988): p. 9-10. In Islamic Revival: Catalysts, 
Categories, and Consequences, Dekemjian underlines of the multidimensional crisis, particularly a 
crisis in the socio-political and economic fields as one of the main factors of the emergence of 
Islamic revivalism. 
37 See Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, Globalization and Religion from an Indonesian Perspective 
in Heidi Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (editor), Overcoming Fundamentalism: Ethical 
Responses from Five Continents (Geneva: Globethics.net, 2009): p. 89-109. 
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absolute, and exclusive religion of peoples all over the world.”38 He objects the 
common view that the Indonesian fundamentalism is rooted in the 
argumentation emphasizing that globalization as a new idolatry is a 
fundamentalist religion of consumerism (greed, lies and waste), and therefore 
fundamentalism is perceived as a rhetorical wake-up call to the major religions 
to oppose this new idolatry. Globalization, he insists, is not religion, not even 
false religion.39 He assesses that the rise of the Indonesian fundamentalism is 
more of a reaction against any sorts of unjust socio-economic and political 
system. He states that “Religions should play a part in modifying the mosaic of 
structures that make up globalization, especially those that tend towards 
idolatry, destruction of the environment and oppression of the poor”.40  
According to Rissakota “The power of Islamic fundamentalism in 
Indonesia does not come from petrodollars but rather from a compelling counter 
narrative in opposition to the determinist narrative of world systems theory”.41 It 
can be viewed that the Indonesian fundamentalism is a counter narrative against 
the deterministic systems, one of which is capitalism. He repels the historical 
perspective on global domination that claims that “religion is a secondary 
category. Religion is considered only a sub-system of economics. In dependency 
theory, religion may be seen as a tool for domination. Religion may be a political 
base or an interest group. Or religion is viewed as a commodity, something that 
is “sold” for economic motives. He takes on the same line with George Yudice’s 
assessment42 that religion and culture are increasingly understood as resources to 
be managed. But in any case, religion is considered marginal. The real system of 
globalization runs on wealth and power.”43 He refuses the idea that place 
religions as an instrument for economic or political motives. 
He further explains that: 
“I do not believe that religion is a sub-system of economics. In different 
ways, Durkheim, Mendieta, Benedict Anderson and Charles Taylor all 
argue that religion shapes the fundamental social imaginary that makes 
human communities possible, including the global community. 
Whether or not this is so, religion, at the least, is a basic structure of 
human communities that interacts with other basic structures, 
 
38 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 90.  
39 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 90. 
40 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 91. 
41 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 104. 
42 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 103. 
See also George Yúdice, The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2003). 
43 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 103. 
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including economic structures, to create and maintain our world. 
Religion is one of the major forces of globalization, tying people 
together across the globe, transcending race, nationality, culture and 
class. We may view religion as sometimes the handmaid of imperialism, 
blessing the colonizers and softening up their victims for domination. 
But that is not the whole story. Religion also frequently works for 
liberation, resistance to oppression, education, health and human 
equality. Religion will never be just a subsystem of economics because 
people from all religions are frequently motivated by transcendent 
values that cannot be “tamed” by economic greed.”44 
If we posit Rissakota’s assessment in the context of the Indonesian 
fundamentalism, it denotes an important perspective about the emergence of 
fundamentalism as a class struggle from the oppressed groups both economically 
and politically against the deterministic system of capitalism. Religion shown in 
the movement of fundamentalists is used as the instrument binding them to 
achieve their goal of transforming and rectifying inequitable system. Religious 
dogmas are also used as the alternative ideological values proposed to replace the 
values the fundamentalists consider unfair and unjust. Fundamentalism in the 
perspective of the theory of the social function of religion as in the idea of Marx, 
Freud, and Durkheim45 is defined as a social act and movement of transforming 
the social systems applicable in the society.  
Another researcher, Yahya Wijaya, marks the emergence of the 
Indonesian fundamentalism as a reaction against the deterministic systems of 
politics and economy.46 In “Islamic Fundamentalism on the Economy” he looks 
into the movement of HTI as an act of confronting injustice in economic and 
political field. The objective of HTI’s fundamentalism in insisting the 
implementation of Sharia is to promote the transformation of economic welfare 
and politics.47 In “Controversies over Sharia” he takes example of the dispute 
between two groups of fundamentalists in Indonesian parliament; Christian 
fundamentalists and Islamic fundamentalists that affiliate to political parties. 
Christian fundamentalists firmly stand to oppose the implementation of Sharia 
law. While, the Islamic fundamentalists argue that moral decadency of Indonesia 
is only able to be overcome by the strict implementation of Islamic law in any 
 
44 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 103-
104 
45 See Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, translated by Karen 
Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995). 
46 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 132-
140. 
47 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 143-
144. 
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level. Its implementation is not only for Muslim society but also must be applied 
in any field of economy, politics, public service, education, and other sectors. He 
writes:  
“Fifty-six members of the Indonesian parliament recently submitted a 
petition protesting by laws which they consider Sharia-based. Most of 
these members of parliament are affiliated with a political party which 
is supported by both conservative-Evangelical and Pentecostal/ 
Charismatic Christians. The petition reflects the tension which exists 
between the Muslim and Christian communities, particularly their 
fundamentalist wings, concerning the attempt to implement Sharia 
more explicitly in Indonesia. The Muslims are concerned with 
increasing moral problems of the country, which, they believe can 
only be solved by implementing Sharia more comprehensively and 
assertively, not only in the conventional areas, such as marriage and 
worship within the Muslim community, but also in the wider public 
sphere of politics, the economy, public services, the media, civil law 
and education.”48  
The implementation of Sharia in pluralistic society of Indonesia not only 
endangers the principle of equality, but its primary threat to social order lies in 
its feature of exclusionism. Urging the implementation of a single standard of 
religious norms into pluralistic society in the name of the “majority reason” only 
leads to the elimination and alienation the other religious adherents. I stand in 
the same line with the scholars who stress that the implementation of Sharia is a 
simplistic and lacks a credible analysis of contemporary social problems.49 
In his further commentary of "Islamic Fundamentalism on the 
Economy", Yahya explains that the use of the Sharia principle in the economic 
field is a motion of resistance to the (Western) capitalist system. While 
reaffirming the assessment of Pradana Boy, he writes that “the phenomenon of 
the Sharia economy is related to the increase of religious fundamentalism, which 
derives the attempt to Islamize all levels of societal life….this attempt as a 
cultural strategy of Islamic fundamentalism to tackle the domination of global 
(read: Western) capitalism and its cultural invasion. Sharia is understood as a 
form of local culture to be reasserted in order to “de-westernize” the society.”50 
In his conclusion Yahya stresses that the Indonesian fundamentalism is 
not only defined and understood in the scope of “truth claim” but also in the 
ethics of economic problems. He insists that:  
 
48 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 139. 
49 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 140. 
50 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 143. 
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“The contradiction between Christian and Islamic fundamentalist 
groups is not limited to the matter of “truth claims” as focused on in 
much inter-religious dialogue. In terms of economic ethics, there is 
potential conflict between the two groups in a way that reflects Samuel 
Huntington’s theory on the Clash of Civilizations. Whilst the Christian 
fundamentalist-neo-Pentecostal groups tend to take the existing market 
economy for granted, feeling free to employ its strategy and culture, the 
Islamic ones struggle for an alternative, designed according to the 
system operated in the early period of the development of Islam. 
However, a practical confrontation between them will not easily occur, 
since the ambition of the Islamic groups to put their concept into 
practice by first getting rid of the existing economic system, finds it 
hard to gain enough support from the wider Islamic community. Even 
the Muslim business community which may share the ideal of the 
fundamentalist groups, in practice takes a more pragmatic way, making 
possible easy relations with any business actor in the marketplace, 
regardless of religious affiliation.”51 
 
RECOMMENDATION 
Siswono Yudohusodo, Minister of Transmigration of Suharto’s 
administration, 27 years ago forewarned of the problem of social injustice as the 
bottom source of any sorts of any revolt. In his welcoming speech during the 
book launch of “Demografi Politik: Pembangunan Indonesia Dari Riau Sampai 
Timor-Timur” (Demography of Politics: The Development of Indonesia from 
Riau to East Timor), he alerted that “Ketidakadilan sosial merupakan alasan bagi 
segmen-segmen masyarakat untuk memilih jalannya sendiri-sendiri: social 
injustice is the reason of why social groups take their own approaches”.52 The 
main context of his note was the revival of insurgent groups of Free Papua 
Movement, Free Aceh Movement and Disintegration Movement of East Timor.  
The core point of his remarks lies in the example he took of the 
historical proof of the split of India and Pakistan in 1948 that he considered as an 
example. Disintegration of India and Pakistan had roots in social clash between 
Hindus and Muslims. Pakistanis who are dominantly Muslims are discriminated 
by the Hindus.  It went the same to the split of Pakistan and Bangladesh which 
 
51 Ed. Heide Hadsell/Christoph Stuckelberger (2009), Overcoming Fundamentalism: p. 147.  
52 See the report of Suara Pembaruan, book launch with the title “Siswono: Ketidakadilan 
Sosial Merupakan Roh Pemberontakan”: p. 17. The book is “Demografi Politik: Pembangunan 
Indonesia Dari Riau Sampai Timor-Timur”, written by fellow researcher of LIPI (Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences), Riwanto Tirtosudarno.  See also Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, “Demografi Politik: 
Pembangunan Indonesia Dari Riau Sampai Timor-Timur” (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996). 
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are both Muslim countries. Siswono ensured that those problems are rooted in 
the absence of social justice. What Siswono has stated and alerted almost three 
decades ago has still been relevant in our time.  
Indonesia is not only suffered from the rebellious acts of separation, but 
also from social cleavage such as fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism, and 
terrorism of the hardliner groups. Bassam Tibi aptly explicates it that religious 
fundamentalism has nothing to do with spiritual belief, but dominantly it is 
related to political activity in which religion is employed as a political 
instrument. He emphasizes that ”Religious  Fundamentalism  not  as  a  spiritual  
faith,  but  as  a  political  ideology based on the politicizing of religion for 
sociopolitical and economic goals  in  the  pursuit  of  establishing  a  divine  
order.  By  definition,  then,  this  ideology  is  exclusive,  in  the  sense  that  it  
attacks  opposing  options,  primarily  those secular outlooks that resist the 
linking of religion to politics”53 
The phenomenon of Indonesian contemporary fundamentalism that is 
characterized by acute segmentation among Indonesian people based on 
ethnicity, religion, and race have to be comprehended through tracing the roots 
on the ill policies at any sectors since the time of New Order regime. 
Fundamentalism that is perceived as the source of socio-cultural clash in our 
time has the roots in the past. We may consider the analysis of Daniel Dhakidae 
in Cendikiawan dan Kekuasaan (Intellectual and Power)54 and the Harold 
Crouch in The Army and Politics in Indonesia55 that closely examine of this 
problem. And also I place the important report of Adam Schwarz of the 
discriminatory policies of New Order regime that bears the identity politics or 
racial politics along the Reformation era.56 They envision the face of Indonesia in 
the future through identifying the policies the stakeholders performs in all 
sectors. The revival of the fundamentalist groups at the present must be 
perceived as the “rotten fruit” of the ill-policies in the past, particularly in the 
sector of politics and economy. Schwarz report on the economic policy that was 
dominated by Chinese ethnic, for example, bears a religious sentiment, and it is 
fundamentalism as one of the horrific excess. This is the convincing ground of 
 
53 Bassam  Tibi,  The  Challenge  of  Fundamentalism : Political  Islam  and  the  New  World  
Disorder, (University of California Press: 1998) Cet. 1, h. 20. 
54 See the analysis of Daniel Dhakidae, Cendikiawan dan Kekuasaan Dalam Negara Orde Baru 
= Intellectual and Power in State of New Order Regime (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2003): 
p. 561-608. 
55 See Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (USA: Cornell University Press, 
1978). 
56 See Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (San Francisco: Westview 
Press Boulder, 1994). 
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why fundamentalism is counted as a rebellious act against social injustice and 
discriminatory systems. 
It is convincingly acceptable to admit of what Budiono 
Kusumohamidjojo stresses that the phenomenon of the revival of 
fundamentalism, extremism, radicalism and terrorism must be taken as the alert 
of the fact of the absence of the implementation of Pancasila, particularly of its 
fifth principle; Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia (Social justice to the 
Indonesian people).57 The absence of social justice is the upshot of the triple 
primitivism; bureaucratic primitivism in the form of corruption-collusion-
nepotism, political primitivism in the form of oligarchic politics, and social 
primitivism in the form of racial supremacy. The first two primitivisms are the 
causes, while the third is the outcome. Fundamentalism therefore cannot only 
be regarded as religious arrogance and supremacy, but also as an alternative 
choice and at the same time as an act of repelling any kinds of the unfairness of 
social systems.  
Fundamentalism from this side of reference must be conceded as a wake-
up call of the importance of transforming systems, approaches and public 
institutions in any fields. The “gradual Christianization” movement in the 
American fundamentalists or “gradual Islamisation” in the Indonesian 
fundamentalist and puritans must not merely be discerned as the religious 
movement an sich. They are the explicit expression and the vivid utterance of 
the counteraction against injustice. The Jemaah Tabliyah movement in 
Indonesia that adopted the ideology of Ikhwanul Muslim/Muslimin (Muslim 
Brotherhood), for example, is importantly viewed as the social movement. The 
movement copies the idea of “gradual Islamisation”: moving in phases from 
Islamising individuals, to Islamising families, to Islamising society, and then 
Islamising the polity.58 It is an alternative movement and also an express of their 
resentment of the absence of social justice.  
Though the essentialist theorists of religion like Edward Burnett Tylor, 
James George Frazer, Rudolf Otto, and including Ernest Bloch disagree with 
functionalist theorists that reduce religion to economy and politics, 
fundamentalism as a socio-religious movement is very much shaped by the 
political economic aspects. Bloch, for example, states that “religion would be ill 
perceived if reduced to economic and social conditions because religion is an 
 
57 See Budiono Kusumohamidjojo, Filsafat Politik dan Kotak Pandora Abad ke-21: Political 
Philosophy and the Pandora’s Box of the 21st Century (Yogyakarta: Percetakan Jalasutra, 2014):  p. 
227-231 
58 Edited by Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (2016), Islam, Politics and Change: The 
Indonesian Experience after the Fall of Suharto: p. 48 
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entity in itself. Though it is embedded in social realities, it is not simply a 
reflection of them and can affect both social and economic conditions of life”.59 
The essentialists in some reasons are on the mark, but fundamentalism from the 
perspective of social function of religion of the functionalists like Karl Marx, 
Sigmund Freud, Emil Durkheim and many others has its relevance in social 
movement against social injustice. Amartya Sen on the other hand warns of the 
importance of placing the social justice on the first place if the world intends to 
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